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ARTICLES
MODERNIZING LOCAL RESPONSES TO
PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES:
BIOTERRORISM, EPIDEMICS, AND THE
MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH
POWERS ACT
by DanielS. Reich*

I. INTRODUCTION

Public health experts had been issuing clarion calls for years,
warning that the American system is a house of cards that could
crumble at any moment. Author Laurie Garrett lamented that "[the]
twenty-first century dawned with America's public health system in
dire disarray" and
[a]s incredible as it might seem, given America's breathtaking
prosperity at the close of the 1990s, most of the problems and
crises [found] in the health apparati of central Africa, the Indian
subcontinent, and former Soviet Union could also to one degree
or another be found in the United States.'
Nobel laureate Dr. Joshua Lederberg warned that the public health
system "is very close to being in a shambles at this time."2 And yet, in
an era of globalization, general economic prosperity, and American
political, military, and economic dominance in the world, few
Americans questioned the ability of the public health infrastructure to
protect the nation's public health.
All this changed in the fall of 2001, following the tragic September
11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon and

" Associate Debevoise & Plimpton. J.D., Yale Law School, 2002; B.A., Yale
College, 1998. The author wishes to thank Anita Allen, James E. Baker, W.
Michael Reisman, and Mark R. Shulman, for their help in thinking through the
issues discussed in this Article.
1. Laurie Garrett, Betrayal of Trust: The Collapse of Global Public Health
268 (2000).
2. Id. at 282 (quoting Dr. Joshua Lederberg).
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an anthrax scare that followed soon after.' These two events awakened
Americans to the real threat of bioterrorism and the tremendous
importance of a sound public health response infrastructure. 4 When
considering the need for adequate response to public health
emergencies arising from bioterrorism, it became obvious that the
threat was not just from acts of bioterrorism but any form of virulent
contagious disease, and the debate about the public health system's
preparedness quickly began to encompass response to naturally
occurring infectious diseases.5 The threat of virulent contagious disease
again became a matter of public attention both in the United States
and around the world following the rapid spread of SARS (Severe
Acute Respiratory Syndrome) in the spring of 2003 from China to
several other countries.6
Underlying the debate about updating the nation's laws to allow for
better public health preparedness are important questions about the
proper balance between coercion, on the one hand, and leadership, on
the other. While few would advocate coercion over effective
leadership, it is important to distinguish between what the government
may do and what the government should do. On one side of the debate
are those who advocate building strong emergency powers into law powers that would allow the state to compel citizens to undergo
medical examinations, vaccinations, treatment and quarantine should
the circumstances require such measures.7 As a group of academics,

3. Lawrence Gostin, Law and Ethics in a Public Health Emergency; at Law,
HASTINGS CTR.

REPORT,

March 1, 2002, at 9. At the time of publication of this

Article, the source of the anthrax attack in the United States remains a mystery.
See Eric Lipton & Kirk Johnson, The Anthrax Trail: Tracking Bioterror's Tangled
Course, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2001, at Al.
4. Bill Miller, Study Urges Focus on Terrorism With High Fatalities, Cost,
WASH. POST, Apr. 29, 2002, at A3; Larry Copeland, CDC Proposes Bioterrorism
Laws, USA TODAY, Nov. 8, 2001, at 3A; Marcia Coyle, States Urged to Update
Antiquated Public Health Laws, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 5, 2001, available at
http://www.law.com.
5. Gostin, Law and Ethics in a Public Health Emergency; at Law, supra note
3, at 9.
6. See Dean E. Murphy, In U.S., Fear is Spreading Faster than SARS, April
17, 2003, N.Y. TIMES, at Al; Denise Grady, Fear Reigns as Dangerous Mystery
Illness Spreads,April 7, 2003, N.Y. TIMES, at Al.
7. See, e.g., Cantigny Conference Series, State Emergency Health Powers and
the Bioterrorism Threat 7 (2001) [hereinafter State Emergency Health Powers and
the Bioterrorism Threat]; Lawrence Gostin, YES: New Laws are Needed to Enable
Federal and State Agencies to Work Together in an Emergency, Insight on the
News, Dec. 18, 2001, available at http://www.insightmag.com/main.cfm/include/
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lawyers and government officials concluded at a recent conference on
State Emergency Health Powers and the Bioterrorism Threat: "Clear,
open, and lawful response by government officials is necessary for
public support and preservation of our national values. Rapid
determination of the appropriate balance between
coercive
8
government action and individual civil rights is critical.",
On the other side of the debate, those concerned primarily with
preservation of civil liberties fear the formal expansion of government
power. For most of those skeptics, effective leadership is the key to
preserving public health. Robert Cihak and Michael Glueck note,
"Human freedom is our great strength. Free people respond to
leadership much more vigorously than a people held in place by power,
fear and terror of their own government." 9 The remarkable displays of
civic virtue and cooperation in the aftermath of September 11 serve as
strong proof of the effectiveness of leadership and the willingness of
individual citizens to cooperate on behalf of the community. As health
law expert George Annas has commented, "Now we know how people
react, and they react really well on their own."' This Article addresses
both sides of the argument and builds on the premise that while the
government should strive to exercise effective leadership in the face of
a public health emergency so as to ensure maximal individual freedom
of action, it is vital that the government have the legal authority to
exercise compulsory powers if necessary.

detail/storyid/160392.html; Press Release, U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, Statement by HHS Secretary Tommy G. Thompson Regarding the
Model Emergency Health Powers Act (Oct. 30, 2001), at http://www.hhs.gov/
news/press/2001pres/20011030.htmI [hereinafter Statement by HHS Secretary
Tommy G. Thompson].
8. State Emergency Health Powers and the Bioterrorism Threat, supra note
7, at 7.
9. Robert C. Cihak & Michael Arnold Glueck, No: Swelling the Intrusive
Reach of the States Should be Avoided, INSIGHT ON THE NEWS, Dec. 18, 2002,
available at http://www.insightmag.com/main.cfm/include/detail/storyid/160393.
html; see also Association of American Physicians and Surgeons, AAPS Analysis:
Model Emergency Health Powers Act (MEHPA) Turns Governors into Dictators
(Dec. 3, 2001), available at http://www.aapsonline.org/testimony/emerpower.htm
[hereinafter AAPS Analysis] ("There is no evidence that force works better than
leadership, which can bring out the best in citizens coming together to meet the
crisis, just as firefighters, police, medical professionals, hotel owners, and other
businessmen did in New York City.").
10. Sharon Lerner, Round up the Unusual Suspects, VILLAGE VOICE, Jan. 8,
2002, at 45 (quoting George Annas). Cf William K. Rashbaum, Report on 9/11
Finds Flaws in Response of Police Dept., N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2002, at Al.
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With this framework in mind, the Article analyzes the Model State
Emergency Health Powers Act ("MSEHPA")." Part II gives a short
overview of the Model Act, explains its significance, and presents some
of the major general criticisms that have been leveled against it. Parts
III through V analyze specific elements of the Model Act. Part III
focuses on the Model Act's provisions dealing with measures to detect
and track public health emergencies, particularly reporting and
tracking of private medical information. Part IV discusses the Model
Act's proposed framework for declaration of a public health
emergency. Part V presents the Model Act's provisions relating to the
government's compulsory powers over the person: first analyzing the
section of the Act dealing with examination, testing, vaccine and
treatment, and then doing the same for the section dealing with
isolation and quarantine measures. Part VI concludes. Ultimately, this
paper argues that the MSEHPA provides a strong basis from which
state legislatures should begin to reconsider their public health laws
and update them as necessary but that the Model Act cannot be
adopted in full and must be altered so as to bolster privacy and civil
liberty protections that are unjustifiably weakened to an unnecessary
degree by the Model Act in its current form.

II. THE MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT
The MSEHPA is a Model Act aimed at standardizing and
modernizing state public health legislation across the United States in
order to give officials the authority to act decisively and quickly in the
event of a bioterrorist attack or major outbreak of disease. 2 Much of

11.

Center for Law and the Public's Health at Georgetown and Johns Hopkins

Universities, Model State Emergency Health Powers Act, Dec. 21, 2001 [hereinafter

MSEHPA], availableat http://www.publichealthlaw.net. For an earlier draft of the
MSEHPA, released on October 23, 2001, see Center for Law and the Public's
Health at Georgetown and Johns Hopkins Universities, Model State Emergency
Health Powers Act, Oct. 23, 2001 [hereinafter MSEHPA Version 1 Draft] available
at http://www.publichealthlaw.net/MSEHPAIMSEHPA.pdf.

The MSEHPA was

drafted by Professor Lawrence Gostin of the Center for Law and the Public's
Health at Georgetown and Johns Hopkins Universities, in a project funded by the
Centers for Disease Control, in coordination with the National Governors
Association, the National Conference of State Legislatures, the National
Association of Attorneys General, the Association of State and Territorial Health
Officials, and the National Association of City and County Health Offices.
MSEHPA, supra,at 1.
12. Coyle, supra note 4.
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the problem with existing public health laws is that most state public
health legislation currently on the books dates to the early twentieth
century, and thus predates the advances in public health sciences of the
last century. 13 One important way in which outdated legislation is
insufficient is its lack of clarity. While most states have compulsory
powers through which public health officials can submit individuals to
examination, testing, immunization, treatment, isolation or quarantine,
many of the state statutes that are the basis for these powers were
drafted forty to one hundred years ago and do not articulate clear
criteria for the exercise of those powers.' 4 In addition, the existing laws
were mostly written prior to the seismic developments in the
constitutional law of due process and equal protection over the last
half century and consequently do not reflect current constitutional
standards. 5 The drafting of the MSEHPA reflects an attempt to
correct these shortcomings in existing state laws.
Though the MSEHPA has been in development for several years, it
has gained significant attention since the tragic events of September 11
and the anthrax scare that followed. 6 On October 6, 2001, Gene
Matthews, general counsel of the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention ("CDC"), asked professor of law and public health
Lawrence Gostin to draft the MSEHPA. 7 On October 30, 2001,
Secretary of Health and Human Services ("HHS") Tommy Thompson
issued a statement regarding the MSEHPA, explaining that HHS's
goal is to "develop a consensus-based model legislation to assist states8
that are considering new emergency public health legislation.'
Thompson went on to say that "HHS is dedicated to working with
state and local officials to strengthen America's capacity and ability to
respond to public health emergencies. This draft Model Act is one
more example of the continued work that CDC and others in the
department are undertaking to strengthen our public health
infrastructure on the federal, state, and local levels and protect the

13. Id. For a survey of communicable disease laws in the fifty states, see
Lawrence Gostin et. al., The Law and the Public's Health: A Study of Infectious
Disease Law in the United States, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 59, 101 (1999).
14. Gostin et. al., supra note 13, at 113.
15. Coyle, supra note 4.; Gostin et. al., supra note 13, at 105-106.
16. Gostin, Law and Ethics in a Public Health Emergency; at Law, supra note
3, at 9 ("Following the events of 11 September and 4 October... the need for law
reform captured the attention of political leaders.").
17. Id.
18. Statement by HHS Secretary Tommy G. Thompson, supra note 7.
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nation's health."' 9 Increased concern that existing public health
legislation may be inadequate for the task of setting up a framework
for responding to a bioterrorist attack, combined with introduction of
the MSEHPA, has spurred the national government to encourage state
legislatures to update existing statutes or replace them entirely with
new legislation. A flurry of legislative activity has followed in almost
every state. 2°
Bills based in whole or part on the Model Act have been introduced
in the legislatures of at least thirty-eight states and the District of

19. Id.
20. According to a record of state legislative activity kept by the authors of the
MSEHPA, bills based in whole or part on the Model Act have been introduced in
Alabama (2003 H.B. 335), Arizona (2002 S.B. 1400; 2002 H.B. 2044), California
(2002 A.B. 1763; 2003 A.B. 206), Connecticut (2002 H.B. 5286; 2003 S.B. 245; 2003
S.B. 247; 2003 S.B. 248; 2003 S.B. 404; 2003 S.B. 406; 2003 S.B. 412), Delaware
(2001 H.B. 377), District of Columbia (DC B14-0373; DC A14-380) Florida (2002
S.B. 1262; 2002 S.B. 1264; 2002 H.B. 1579), Georgia (2002 S.B. 385), Hawaii (2001
H.B. 2521; 2001 S.B. 2779), Idaho (2002 H.B. 517), Illinois (2001 S.B. 1529; 2001
H.B. 3809; 2003 H.B. 6; 2003 H.B. 691), Kansas (2002 S.B. 597), Kentucky (2002
H.B. 88; 2002 H.B. 370), Maine (2001 H.P. 1656; 2002 L.D. 2164), Maryland (2002
S.B. 234; 2002 H.B. 296; 2002 H.B. 303), Massachusetts (2001 S.B. 2173; 2001 S.B.
2194; 2001 S.B. 2; 2003 S.B. 597), Minnesota (2001 H.F. 2619; 2002 S.F. 2669; 2002
H.F. 3031), Mississippi (2002 H.B. 1348; 2002 S.B. 2737), Missouri (2002 S.B. 712;

2002 H.B. 1771; 2002 S.B. 1000; 2002 S.B. 854; 2002 S.B. 1280), Nebraska (2002
L.B. 1224), New Hampshire (2001 H.B. 1478), New Jersey (2002 S.B. 1042; 2002
S.B. 1223; 2002 A.B. 1746; 2002 A.B. 1773), New Mexico (2002 H.B. 195; 2003
H.B. 231; 2003 S.B. 194), New York (2001 AB. 9508; 2001 S.B. 5841; 2003 A.B.
6321), North Carolina (2002 H.B. 1508; 2002 S.B. 1166), Ohio (2002 S.B. 296; 2003
S.B. 6), Oklahoma (2002 H.B. 2765; 2002 S.B. 1659; 2003 H.B. 1467), Pennsylvania
(2001 H.B. 2261; 2001 H.B. 2371; 2001 S.B. 1338; 2002 H.B. 2928; 2002 S.B. 1569;
2003 S.B. 206), Rhode Island (2001 H.B. 7357; 2001 H.B. 7563; 2001 S.B. 2865;
2002 H.B. 7305; 2002 S.B. 2304; 2003 H.B. 5747; 2003 S.B. 318), South Carolina
(2002 H.B. 4416), South Dakota (2002 H.B. 1303, 1304), Tennessee (2001 S.B.
2392; 2001 H.B. 2271), Texas (2003 S.B. 399), Utah (2002 H.B. 231), Vermont
(2001 S.B. 298), Virginia (2001 H.B. 882), Washington (2001 H.B. 2854), Wisconsin
(2001 A.B. 849, 850), and Wyoming (2002 S.F. 67; 2003 S.F. 11). See Center for
Law and the Public's Health, The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act State
Legislative Activity, March 24, 2003, available at http://www.publichealthlaw.net
[hereinafter MSEHPA State Legislative Activity]. See also American Legislative
Exchange Council, ALEC Opposes the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act,
at http://www.alec.org (last visited April 18, 2003) (tracking legislation related to
the MSEHPA in the states).
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Columbia."' As of March 2003, twenty-one states and the District of
22
Columbia have already enacted legislation based on the Model Act.
The MSEHPA has come under heavy criticism on multiple fronts
and is the subject of vigorous debate. Standing in opposition to
proponents of the statute, such as Lawrence Gostin and Tommy
Thompson, are groups and individuals who fear the MSEHPA does
not provide sufficient protections to guarantee the privacy and civil
liberties of individuals. The American Legislative Exchange Council
("ALEC"), a non-partisan group of state legislators, has criticized the
Model Act for unnecessarily intruding on civil liberties and for
granting too much coercive power to health officials and governors. 23
George Annas of Boston University School of Law, has also spoken
out against the MSEHPA, criticizing the Model Act for giving
"tremendous powers to unnamed and unaccountable public health
officials to order people examined, treated, vaccinated or quarantined
and do it with immunity unless acting with willful malice, 24 At the core
of the debate over the MSEHPA between advocates of the Model Act
and its critics is the tension between public health and civil liberties.
No state is required to adopt the Model Act and it is unlikely that
the Model Act will be adopted in its entirety by any state. However, it
is certain that many states will draw from the model in revising or
overhauling their public health statutes. 25 As states continue to use the
MSEHPA as a starting point for reconsideration of state public health

21.

See discussion, supra note 20.

22.

See MSEHPA State Legislative Activity, supra note 20. Legislation enacted

includes: Arizona (2002 H.B. 1400; 2002 H.B. 2044), Delaware (2002 H.B. 377),
District of Columbia (DC B14-0373; DC A14-380), Florida (2002 S.B. 1262),
Georgia (2002 S.B. 385), Hawaii (2002 H.B. 2521), Louisiana (2002 H.B. 91),
Maine (2002 L.D. 2164), Maryland (2002 S.B. 234; 2002 H.B. 303), Minnesota
(2002 H.F. 3031), Missouri (2002 S.B. 712), New Hampshire (2002 H.B. 1478), New
Mexico (2002 H.B. 195; 2003 H.B. 231 (pending Governor's expected signature)),
North Carolina (2002 H.B. 1508; 2002 S.B. 1166), Pennsylvania (2002 S.B. 1569),
South Carolina (2002 H.B. 4416), South Dakota (2002 H.B. 1303; 2002 H.B. 1304),
Tennessee (2002 S.B. 2392), Utah (2002 H.B. 231), Vermont (2002 S.B. 298),
Wisconsin (2001 A.B. 850), and Wyoming (2003 S.F. 11). Id.
23. American Legislative Exchange Council, Issue Alert, Model State
Emergency Health Powers Act, Nov. 8, 2001, available at http://www.alec.org;
Michael L. Betsch, Bio-terror Response Plan Would Invade Civil Liberties, Says
Critic, CNSNEwS.CoM, Dec. 11, 2001, at http://www.cnsnews.comNation/archive/
2000112/NAT20011211a.html.
24. Coyle, supra note 4 (quoting George Annas).
25. See Copeland, supra note 4, at 3A (quoting John Thomasian of the
National Governors Association).
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powers, it is worth analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of this
Model Act while state legislators are still in the process of reviewing
and debating its provisions.

III. MEASURES TO DETECT AND TRACK PUBLIC HEALTH
EMERGENCIES

Section 301 of the Model Act deals with mandatory reporting of
diseases and other health conditions. 26 This section calls for health care
workers to "report all cases of persons who harbor any illness or health27
condition that may be potential causes of a public health emergency.
The list of reportable illnesses is to be identified by the state's public
health authority. 8 Furthermore, the model requires that pharmacists
report unusual prescription activity or unusual trends in pharmacy
visits. 29 Included in the list of information to be reported are the
specific illness; the patient's name, date of birth, sex, race, occupation
and current home and work addresses; the name and address of the
health care workers filing the report; and "any other information
needed to locate the patient for follow-up."3 ° Finally, section 301
requires similar reporting requirements of veterinarians and persons
caring for animals in the case of animals "having or suspected of
having any diseases that may be potential causes of a public health
emergency." 3"
Section 302 of the Model Act charges the public health authority
with responsibility for identifying cases of illness or health condition
that may signal an impending public health emergency.32 To carry out
this task, the public health authority is expected to use information
reported in accordance with section 301 in order to "identify all
individuals thought to have been exposed to an illness or health
condition that may be a potential cause of a public health

26. MSEHPA, supra note 11, § 301.
27. Id. §301(a). The list of health care workers includes health care providers,
coroners, medical examiners, as well as in- and out-of-state medical laboratories.
Id. §301(a), (e). For a detailed discussion of the jurisdictional problem relating to
out-of-state laboratories, see LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW:
POWER, DuTy, RESTRAINT 119 (2000).
28. MSEHPA, supra note 11, § 301(a)
29. Id. § 301(b).

30. Id. § 301(c).
31.
32.

Id. § 301(d).
Id. § 302.
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emergency." 33 Once these individuals are identified, section 302 further
authorizes the public health authority to "counsel and interview" them
to obtain information that will assist in identifying exposed individuals
and determining the source of the health threat.34 Information to be
collected includes the name and address of "any person from whom
the illness or health condition may have been contracted and to whom
the illness or health condition may have spread."35 The public health
authority is further authorized to "close, evacuate, or decontaminate
any facility or decontaminate or destroy any material," which the
authority "reasonably suspects" may endanger the public health.36
Finally, the public health authority is required to share information
with the state public safety authorities, tribal authorities and federal
health and public safety authorities.37 Public safety authorities and
other state and local government agencies are also required to share
information with the public health authority.38 In an attempt to protect
the privacy interests of the individuals involved, the Model Act
restricts the information to be shared between authorities to
"information necessary for the treatment,3 control, investigation, and
prevention of a public health emergency. 1
The reporting requirements of the MSEHPA have drawn a great
deal of criticism from privacy advocates. Janlori Goldman, Director of
the Health Privacy Project at Georgetown, has commented that
"[t]here is very little in this Model Act that either builds protections in
for privacy or civil liberties." 4 Similarly, Jennifer King, Director of
ALEC's Health and Human Services Task Force, complained that
"[t]here are almost no privacy protections in this bill at all.",41 Indeed,
the privacy implications of the Model Act's reporting requirements are
serious and deserve serious consideration. 42

33. Id. § 302(a).
34. Id. § 302(b).
35. Id.
36. Id. § 302(c).
37. Id. § 303(b).
38. Id. § 303(a).
39. Id. § 303(c).
40. Drew Clark, Privacy: Bioterrorism Plan Sparks Outcry Over Privacy;
Infringement,NAT'L J. TECH. DAILY, Feb. 6,2002, LEXIS, Nexis, News Group File
(quoting Janlori Goldman).
41. Id. (quoting Jennifer King).
42. The discussion in this Part focuses exclusively on the data reporting
provisions of the Model Act. Any state legislation dealing with protected health
information will also have to comply with the medical privacy regulation of the
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The central question underlying any public health reporting
requirement is where the appropriate balance lies between an
individual's legitimate expectation of privacy and the public health
benefits to society as a whole. Collection of health information is one
of the fundamental responsibilities of any public health system.43 After
all, health data is absolutely necessary for state health authorities to
"identify health risks, inform the public, [and] intervene" to prevent
the spread of disease." The problem with collection of health data is
that it may involve extremely intimate information about a person's
life and, if made public, could seriously affect a person's professional
and personal life, including job prospects, immigration status or access
to insurance.4 ' The sensitive personal health data collected for the
benefit of public health surveillance is especially vulnerable in a world
where electronic records and linked computer databases are used with
increasing frequency.46 In addition, it is important to recognize that
protection of privacy is beneficial to the public health, for people are
more likely to come forward for testing, counseling and treatment if
they know that their privacy will be maintained. For these reasons, it
is essential that individual privacy be protected to the greatest extent
possible even as state health authorities collect the health information
that is so vital to the public health. Ultimately, both the state and the
individual will have to make some concessions for the system to work.
Some degree of privacy will have to be forsaken in the interest of the

Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA). 45 C.F.R.
pts. 160, 164 (2003). For an excellent overview of the HIPAA regulations and their
impact on the proposed rules of the MSEHPA, see Peter P. Swire & Lauren B.
Steinfeld, Modern Studies in Privacy Law: National Health Information Privacy
Regulations Under HIPAA: Security and Privacy After September 11: The Health
Care Example, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1515, 1534-1540 (2002)
43. GOSTIN,supra note 27, at 113.
44. Id. at 115. See also Raymond J. Baxter et. al., Is the U.S. Public Health
System Ready for Bioterrorism? An Assessment of the U.S. Public Health
Infrastructure and its Capacity for Infectious Disease Surveillance, 2 YALE J.
HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 1 (2001) (arguing that the key features of public health
surveillance are information collection and reporting, the orderly consolidation
and evaluation of the data and prompt dissemination of results to relevant health
authorities).
45. GOSTIN, supra note 27, at 115.
46. Patricia I. Carter, Health Information Privacy: Can Congress Protect
Confidential Medical Information in the "Information Age"?, 25 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 223 (1999); James G. Hodge, Jr. et al., Legal Issues Concerning Electronic
Health Information, 282 JAMA 1466 (1999).
47. GOSTIN, supra note 27, at 132; Hodge, Jr. et al., supra note 46, at 1470.
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public health, and, at the same time, health data collection will have to
be less efficient than it otherwise could be if we are to allow the
individual to maintain some semblance of privacy.
While the mandatory reporting of medical records raises serious
constitutional questions relating to privacy, 8 it is clear that mandatory
reporting of health information is constitutional so long as privacy is
adequately protected. In Whalen v. Roe,49 the Supreme Court's most
important case addressing the constitutionality of medical reporting
requirements, a unanimous Court upheld a New York State statute
requiring that the state health authority maintain a centralized
computer file containing the names and addresses of all persons who
obtained certain controlled substances pursuant to a doctor's
prescription.' ° While the Court acknowledged that there exists a
constitutionally protected "zone of privacy" that includes an
individual's "interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters" and
"the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important
decisions," it concluded that the New York program "does not, on its
face, pose a sufficiently grievous threat to either interest to establish a
constitutional violation."'" While the Court did recognize that there is a
serious potential "threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast
amounts of personal information in computerized data banks or other
massive government files," it found that the provisions of the statute in
this instance adequately protected privacy by limiting access to the lists
and building in protection from disclosures.52 In a concurring opinion,
Justice William S. Brennan made a point of the fact that "[t]he
information disclosed by the physician under this program is made
available only to a small number of public health officials with a
legitimate interest in the information. 5 3 Brennan went on to explain
that "broad dissemination by state officials of such information" would
clearly violate constitutionally protected privacy rights, and thus would

48. For the Supreme Court's most important considerations of the concept of a
constitutional right to privacy, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-153 (1973)
(stating that the "right of privacy" is founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's
concept of personal liberty); and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965)
(stating that "[T]he First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected
from governmental intrusion.").
49. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
50. Id. at 591.
51. Id. at 598-600.
52. Id. at 600-01, 605.
53. Id. at 606 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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only be justified by "compelling state interests. 5 4 The Whalen decision
thus makes it clear that mandatory reporting of diseases is
constitutional as long as the collected information is subject to
adequate safeguards and procedures for protection of the patient's
privacy. One should also bear in mind Brennan's emphasis on the
importance of limiting access to the collected data to a very limited
group of public health officials. Nevertheless, the case does evince the
weight accorded by the Court to the government's interest in acquiring
and using information as long as these requirements are met."
Neither the Constitution nor the courts provide clear guidance on
the proper approach to balancing the individual's legitimate
expectation of privacy and the larger societal interests of guaranteeing
the public health. However, Whalen sets down a basic balancing test
that requires local data collection policies to provide adequate privacy
protections. Thus, one must balance the potential harm inflicted on the
community by not reporting a condition that has potentially dangerous
public health implications against the harm inflicted by violating
privacy.
Unfortunately, the MSEHPA does not seem to strike the
appropriate balance between privacy and public health. Even when
one recognizes the need for deference to public health considerations,
this Model Act goes too far in stripping the patient of his or her
privacy. As previously discussed, the list of information to be reported
includes the patient's name, date of birth, sex, race, occupation,
addresses and the catch-all "any other information needed to locate
the patient for follow-up. 5 6 First of all, there is no reason that the
private information about the patient needs to be forwarded to the
state public health authorities. Instead, a two-step approach could be
adopted. It would certainly be possible for each report to have a case
number that would be linked to a patient file in the hospital or doctor's
office. Should the state public health authorities wish to follow up on
the report, they could contact the reporting health care worker and get
the necessary personal information about the individual. While the
categories of sex, race and occupation may help identify some
epidemiological trends, it is by no means clear that the interest served
by reporting these elements of the patient's identity is strong enough
to justify reporting these items of personal information. Finally, the
catch-all phrase is much too broad and leaves too much discretion in

54.

Id.

55.

GOSTIN, supra note

56.

27, at 133.
MSEHPA, supra note 11, § 301(c); see also text accompanying supra note
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the hands of the reporting health care worker to decide what kinds of
personal information should be reported. While there is clearly a need
for some intrusion of the individual's privacy for the sake of the
common good, the detailed personal information required by the
Model Act seems to go well beyond the minimum requirement
necessary for adequate preservation of the public health.
Another problematic aspect of the Model Act is its grant of
authority to the public health authority to "counsel and interview"
individuals identified via the state's reporting methods. On its face, this
policy allowing for what amounts to an involuntary interrogation
seems to be a violation of the Fourth Amendment guarantee of the
"right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against

unreasonable searches and seizures."57 The reported medical
information would likely constitute "probable cause" for a warrant,
and there is no reason that the "counsel and interview" interrogation
should not be subject to the same procedural requirements of Fourth
Amendment criminal procedure and thus subject to issue of a warrant
by a judge.58 There is a strong argument to be made that collection of
the name and address of any person with whom the interviewee had
contact, as provided for in section 302(b), would also violate the
patient's Fourth Amendment rights. An exception might be made in a
situation where a public health emergency has been declared, 9 but
absent a declared state of emergency there is no reason "counsel and
interview" should be allowed where no warrant has been issued.
Ultimately, this type of information gathering should be subject to
judicial review similar to that which exists for issuance of a warrant.
Moreover, the information-sharing provisions of the Model Act are
overbroad. Section 303 requires that public health authorities and
public safety authorities exchange relevant information., Surely
exchange of protected health information is necessary, but the
language of section 303 does not adopt a high enough threshold for
triggering such information exchange. The public safety authority or

57. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
58. See generally Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987); United States v. Ross,
456 U.S. 798 (1982); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978); Marshall v. Barlow's,
Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
59. For examples of exceptions to the warrant requirement in emergency
situations, see Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (allowing exception to warrant requirement
when there is a burning fire), and North American Cold Storage Co. v. City of
Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908) (allowing exception to warrant requirement in a case
involving contaminated food).
60. See discussion in text accompanying supra notes 37-39.
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any other government agency is required to report any illness, health
condition, unusual cluster, or suspicious event "that may be the cause
of a public health emergency." 61 It is unclear why, at the very least, this
trigger is not subject to a reasonableness requirement. After all, the
trigger for the public health authority to report a case of reportable
illness or health condition to public safety authorities is in fact
contingent on a "reasonable belie[f]" that the case in question was
potentially caused by bioterrorism, 62 which does seem fair. Further,
while section 303(c) does limit the sharing of information to
"information necessary for the treatment, control, investigation, and
prevention of a public health emergency,, 63 this broad safeguard needs
to be strengthened with more specification of what constitutes
necessary information for these purposes. Another important
safeguard in this context would be requiring that the sharing of
information not only be limited to necessary information, but that its
distribution be limited to necessary individuals within the state's public
health and public safety authorities.
Section 607 deals with access to protected health information of
persons who have participated in compulsory testing, treatment,
vaccination, isolation or quarantine programs adopted during a public
health emergency, and limits access to "those persons having a
legitimate need to acquire or use the information" for treatment,64
epidemiologic research or investigation of the cause of transmission.
Section 607 also requires that, subject to certain clearly defined
exceptions, "protected health information held by the public health
authority shall not be disclosed without individual written, specific
informed consent., 65 However, the information currently reported
under section 301 is not subject to such a specific consent requirement.
The model act should adopt a more limited reporting requirement
under sections 301 as previously suggested, 66 and apply a specific
consent requirement like that in section 607(b) to protected health
information not reported under a more limited version of section 301.
If one adopts this Article's suggested two-step approach to release of
protected health information, 67 such a specific consent requirement for
the release of protected health information not reported under the first

61.

MSEHPA, supra note 11, § 303(a).

62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. § 303(b).
Id. § 303(c).
Id. § 607(a).
Id. § 607(b).
See text following supra note 56.
See text following supra note 56.

66.
67.
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step could be effective and workable. The non-personal information
indicating potential of a public health emergency could be released
without consent under a more limited version of section 301, while
release of personal information used in investigating the source and
spread of an illness or health condition would be predicated on a
specific consent requirement similar to that which exists in section 607.
Should the patient refuse specific consent, then the Model Act could
authorize the public health authority to obtain the protected health
68
information pursuant to a court order.
In addition to the privacy concerns raised by the Model Act's
proposed reporting requirements, it is important to consider the
deficiencies of the current state reporting systems and whether the
MSEHPA does anything to address these. An article in the American
Medical Association publication American Medical News highlighted
some of the most significant problems plaguing the current state
reporting mechanisms. 69 These include the following complaints: (1)
each state has its own reporting mechanism and its own lists of
reportable diseases;7 ° (2) health care workers have trouble keeping
track of the long list of reportable diseases; (3) reporting procedures
are cumbersome and inefficient; and (4) reporting times vary widely,
ranging from one day to more than a year, with the average falling
between two and three weeks. 71 At the very least, the MSEHPA should
seek to correct these known deficiencies of the current web of
individualized state reporting systems.
The very fact that the Model Act has been drafted and is being
considered in a large number of state legislatures should help in the
effort to standardize state reporting mechanisms. The Model Act
requires that reportable illnesses and conditions will include, but not
be limited to, biological agents enumerated in 42 C.F.R. § 72, app. A,
68.

See, e.g., MSEHPA, supra note 11, § 607(b)(4) (authorizing disclosures of

protected health information "pursuant to a court order to avert a clear danger to
an individual or the public health").
69. Victoria Stagg Elliott, Public Health Reporting Flaws Spell Trouble, AM.
MED. NEWS, Apr. 22/29, 2002, available at http://www.amaassn.org/scipubs/am
news/pick_ 02/hl120422.htm.
70. See id. For a survey of the various infectious disease reporting
requirements of U.S. states and territories and the substantial differences between

them, see Sandra Roush et al., Mandatory Reporting of Diseases and Conditions by
Health Care Professionals and Laboratories,282 JAMA 164 (1999). For the most
recent survey of state reporting requirements, see Council of State and Territorial
Epidemiologists, Nationally Notifiable Disease Survey (May 2001), available at
http://www.cste.org/Surveys/ NNDSSresults.htm.
71. See Elliott, supra note 69.
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as well as "any illnesses or health conditions identified by the public
health authority. ' 2 So while every state will be able to add any
conditions that are particular to it (such as those that are only found in
certain regions of the country), widespread adoption of this provision
would significantly help standardize the list of diseases and conditions
that require reporting, thereby decreasing the confusion felt by health
care workers and filling in gaps in current national reporting. The
Model Act may also help alleviate the problem of cumbersome and
inefficient reporting methods with its requirement that reports "be
made electronically or in writing within [twenty-four (24) hours] to the
public health authority. 7' The possibility of electronic reporting may
help to correct some of the cumbersome aspects of existing reporting
methods. Electronic reporting also has the advantage of allowing for
proper safeguards to be built into a central database so as to limit
access to information to those who need it. Furthermore, the twentyfour hour requirement, if enforced, would certainly correct the current
lack of timely reporting. Thus, it does seem that the MSEHPA
addresses some of the most significant shortcomings of the current
reporting system and may help to correct them.

IV. DECLARING A STATE OF PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY

The MSEHPA provides that the governor may declare a 74state of
public health emergency in any of the following circumstances:
A "public health emergency" is an occurrence or imminent threat of
an illness or health condition that:
(1) is believed to be caused by any of the following: (i)
bioterrorism; (ii) the appearance of a novel or previously
controlled or eradicated infectious agent or biological toxin; (iii)
[a natural disaster;];(iv) [a chemical attack or accidental release;
or] (v) [a nuclearattack or accident]; and
(2) poses a high probability of any of the following harms: (i) a
large number of deaths in the affected population; (ii) a large
number of serious or long-term disabilities in the affected
population; or (iii) widespread exposure to an infectious or toxic

72.
73.

MSEHPA, supra note 11, § 301(a).

Id. § 301(c) (brackets in original).
Id. § 401 (authorizing the governor to declare a public health emergency
upon the occurrence of a "public health emergency" as defined in § 104(m)).

74.
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agent that poses a significant risk of substantial future harm to a
large number of people in the affected population.75
Adopting this broad definition of a "public health emergency," the
Model Act authorizes the governor to declare a state of emergency
either in the event of a bioterrorist attack or upon the discovery of a
particularly virulent virus or disease, when either scenario involves a
threat that poses a "high probability" of leading to a large number of
deaths, causing serious or long term disability to the population, or
widely exposing the population to an infectious agent that is likely to
cause large-scale infection.
Once a state of public health emergency is declared, the governor's
scope of authority includes the power to: (1) suspend any statutory
provisions regulating the conduct of state business to the extent that
strict compliance with these provisions would "prevent, hinder, or
delay necessary action (including emergency purchases)" by the state's
public health authority in responding to the emergency; (2) utilize all
available state and local resources as "reasonably necessary" to
respond to the emergency; (3) mobilize the state's National Guard
units; (4) coordinate with other states; and (5) seek aid from the
federal government. 76 In the state of public health emergency, the
public health authority is charged with coordinating the state's
response to the emergency and has "primary jurisdiction,
responsibility, and authority" for planning and executing this response,
for coordinating between state and local authorities and for
collaborating with federal authorities.77
The Model Act authorizes the governor to declare a state of public
health emergency without consulting anyone "when the situation calls
for prompt and timely action., 78 In order declare a state of public
health emergency, the governor must issue an executive order that
specifies:
(a) the nature of the public health emergency,
(b) the political subdivision(s) or geographic area(s) subject to
the declaration,
(c) the conditions that have brought about the public health
emergency,
(d) the duration of the state of the public health emergency, if
less than thirty (30) days, and

75. Id. § 104(m) (italics and brackets in original).
76. MSEHPA, supra note 11, § 403(a).
77. Id. § 403(b).
78.

Id. § 401.
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(e) the primary public health authority responding to the
79
emergency.
While the governor has the executive authority to decide whether a
state of public health emergency should be declared, he is required by
the model statute to declare the nature and cause of the emergency
and identify the specific area to which it applies. Moreover, the
governor must clearly state the duration of the emergency, which can
last no longer than thirty days unless the governor takes action to
renew the executive order.80 The governor is required to terminate the
state of emergency by executive order upon finding that the
circumstances no longer pose a "high probability" of large-scale death,
disability or widespread infection.8' Furthermore, the state of
emergency shall be terminated automatically after thirty days and can
only be renewed by issuance of a new executive order. 812Any renewal
secured in this way shall likewise terminate after thirty days unless it is
formally renewed by executive order. 3
The only check against the governor's power to declare a state of
public health emergency is a provision empowering the state
legislature to terminate the state of emergency by a majority vote in
both chambers.8 While this check is certainly important, an even more
effective check on the governor's authority would be to require
approval by majority vote of the state legislature to renew the state of
emergency after the first thirty-day period elapses. With the broad
grant of powers that follows from the declaration of a state of
emergency, it seems that, at the very least, the state legislature should
actively be involved in granting the governor the authority to invoke
such broad powers. This is the logic of a check on executive power that
underlies the War Powers Act, which requires Congressional approval
for prolonging a state of war declared by the President beyond sixty
85
days, and the same logic should be extended to the exercise of

79. Id. § 402.
80. Id.; see also id. § 405(b) (stating that "the declaration of a state of public
health emergency shall be terminated automatically after thirty (30) days unless
renewed by the Governor under the same standards and procedures set forth in
[Article IV].").
81. Id. § 405(a).
82. Id. § 405(b). For exact text of § 405(b), see supra note 80.
83. Id.
84. Id. § 405(c).
85. The War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1544 (2002), Pub. L. No. 93-148, §
5, 87 Stat. 555, 556 (1973). For a thorough academic consideration of the
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executive power in the states with regard to public health emergencies.
At a minimum, the MSEHPA should follow the example of federal
law on termination of national emergencies, which stipulates that
"[n]ot later than six months after a national emergency is declared, and
not later than the end of each six-month period thereafter that such
emergency continues, each House of Congress shall meet to consider a
vote on a joint resolution to determine whether that emergency shall
be terminated." 86 A six-month period is too long to allow a public
health emergency to continue unchecked, but the general principle of
legislative review of the executive's declaration of a state of emergency
applies. Applying this approach, the governor's executive power to
declare a state of public health emergency can be effectively narrowed
by either requiring that both houses of the state legislature actively
vote to renew the state of emergency beyond thirty days, or
alternatively, the act could require, rather than just allow, that each
house of the state legislature shall meet to consider a vote on a joint
resolution to determine whether the state of public health emergency
should be terminated.
It is worth noting that the original October 2001 draft of the
MSEHPA had a much broader definition of "public health
emergency," 87 which was then seriously narrowed in the most recent
draft of December 21, 2001 in response to widespread criticism of the
original definition. 88 Nevertheless, even after the definition of "public
health emergency" was narrowed, the scope of what is considered an

effectiveness of the War Powers Act, see John Hart Ely, Suppose Congress Wanted
a War Powers Act that Worked, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1379 (1988).
86. 50 U.S.C. § 1622(b) (2002).

87.

MSEHPA Version 1 Draft, supra note 11, § 104(1) (defining "public health

emergency" as "an occurrence or imminent threat of an illness or health condition,
caused by bioterrorism, epidemic or pandemic disease, or novel and highly fatal
infectious agent or biological toxin, that poses a substantial risk of a significant
number of human fatalities or incidents of permanent or long-term disability. Such
illness or health condition includes, but is not limited to, an illness or health
condition resulting from a natural disaster.").
88. See, e.g., Wendy E. Permet & Wendy K. Mariner, A Health Act That
Jeopardizes Public Health, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 1, 2001, at A15 ("The definition
of an emergency is extremely broad and seemingly without review, raising
troubling constitutional questions ... Read literally, the Model Act allows the
declaration of an emergency, triggering all its coercive powers, every flu season.");
AAPS Analysis, supra note 9 ("Under this Act, any Governor could appoint
himself dictator by declaring a 'public health emergency.' . . . What is a public
health emergency? It is whatever the Governor decides it should be.").
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emergency continues to elicit a great deal of criticism. 9 While the
criticism of the Model Act's emergency powers provision is
understandable given the deep-rooted fear of abuse of power by
executives in our country, there are certainly circumstances where the
executive may have a legitimate need to invoke emergency powers.90
As Alexander Hamilton wrote in the Federalist Number 36, "[t]here
are certain emergencies of nations in which expedients that in the
ordinary state of things ought to be forborne become essential to the
public weal. And the government, from the possibility of such
emergencies, ought ever to have the option of making use of them." 91
While the federal government and all states already consider threats to
the public health to be a legitimate basis for declaration of a state of
emergency, many of the current laws are antiquated and do require
reconsideration. National emergency tends to be associated with
national security, and before September 11, few people linked public
health and national security in their minds. Unfortunately, it took an
anthrax scare in the fall of 2001 to make the general population aware
that threats to the public health are real and may indeed rise to the
level of threats to the national security. 3 Thus, it is important to

89. See, e.g., Jennifer King, Power Grab: The States in a State of Emergency,
The Model Emergency Health Powers Act, ALEC ISSUE ANALYSIS (American
Legislative Exchange Council, Washington, D.C.), Jan. 2002, at 1-2, available at
http://www.alec.org (stating that "powers granted under the MEHPA are
duplicative and unnecessary" and that the "vagueness of the language and lack of
definitions of key terms [in the MSEHPA] leaves too many questions
unanswered"); Robert Cihak & Michael Glueck, CDC Proposal Overreaches,
USA TODAY, Jan. 3, 2002, at 10A (arguing against the MSEHPA, with one of the
grounds for objection being that the governor can declare a public health
emergency without consulting public-health officials so long as he declares that "a
potentially fatal threat could exist").
90. For a superb overview of the philosophical underpinning and historical
development of emergency powers doctrine, and modem scholarship on the
questions that follow from this doctrine, see Jules Lobel, Comment, Emergency
Power and the Decline of Liberalism,98 YALE L.J. 1385 (1989).

91.

THE FEDERALIST

No. 36, at 223 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter

ed., 1961).
92. For an overview of federal and state grants of emergency powers to the
executive, see Lobel, supra note 90, at 1408-1409 fn.117-120.
93. See Gerberding, Hughes & Koplan, Bioterrorism Preparedness and
Response: Clinicians and Public Health Agencies as Essential Partners, 287 JAMA
898 (2002); Leonard Cole, When Smallpox Failed, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2001, § 4, at
5; Lawrence Altman, Plan for Smallpox Rules Out Mass Vaccination, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 27, 2001, at B7; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, He Routed Smallpox, Now Tackles
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recognize the very real dangers that public health emergencies pose
and that there is a need to plan for effective response well in advance
of such emergencies. 94
Large scale public health threats, be they the result of bioterrorist
attack or an outgrowth of a naturally occurring epidemic, require
extraordinary measures by the government. Use of quarantine, travel
restrictions and the commandeering of private resources such as
hospitals and pharmacies become measures citizens may be willing to
bear in order to protect their own health and to limit the exacerbation
of an already acute problem. At such tense moments, it is important
that our laws permit flexibility of response for fear that they otherwise
might be ignored altogether or adhered to with disastrous
consequences.
This Article proceeds from the assumption that planning for all
exigencies within the framework of law is preferable to planning for
extralegal responses in the face of necessity. When the pressure on the
system is too great, emergency powers help maintain proper
equilibrium. The tension between the need for vigorous adherence to
our laws in even the most trying of times and the need to relax them
when necessity dictates has been constant throughout the history of the
United States. As Professor Jules Lobel has written, "[a] fundamental
tension exists in any constitutional order between the basic premise of
government constrained by law and the perceived need for unfettered,
discretionary power to confront dire emergencies and crisis."95
Emergency powers are not to be invoked lightly, for they pull at the
Constitution and force tremendous strain upon the governmental
structures. Nevertheless, necessity sometimes requires that the civil
liberties of the individual give way to the greater good and that the
wise system of checks and balances built into the Constitution be
relaxed. This is the underlying logic of states of emergency-they are
the release valves that enable laws to be as robust as they are in normal
circumstances. Without emergency powers, the law may end up being

Bioterror, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2001, §1B, at 1; Judith Miller, U.S. Set to Retain
Smallpox Stocks, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2001, at Al; Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Judith
Miller, Bioterror Role an Uneasy Fit for the C.D.C., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2001,
§1A, at 1; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Struggling to Reach a Consensus on Preparations
for Bioterrorism, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2001, at B1; Lawrence Altman, U.S. Sets Up
Plan to Fight Smallpox in Case of Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2001, § 1A,at 1.
94. Dr. Jeffrey Koplan, Director of the Centers for Disease Control, Address,
Building Infrastructure to Protect the Public's Health, Sept. 21, 2001, available at
http://www.phppo.cdc.gov/documents/ koplanastho.pdf
95. Lobel, supra note 90, at 1386.
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disregarded altogether; or, as Oliver Cromwell would have had it:
"[niecessity hath no law., 96 Some of the opponents of the MSEHPA
have expressed similar sentiments to those of Cromwell, rejecting the
idea that the law should incorporate a degree of flexibility that would
allow adaptation to even the most trying circumstance and accepting
that the law may have to be disregarded if necessity should so require.
For example, MSEHPA critics Robert Cihak and Michael Glueck have
argued that "government officials throughout the ages have bent the
law in response to unprecedented circumstances; we're sure officials
would be so inclined and adept if a real need arose. In the meantime,
expanded state government 'emergency' powers likely would be
abused more often than appropriately used." 97 While the arguments in
favor of building emergency powers into law are powerful, they
inevitably give individuals pause and require that Americans pay heed
to the rational fears of skeptics.
The concerns expressed regarding broad grants of authority are
natural and reasonable responses to the corrupting nature of power,
but the wisest approach is to properly tailor emergency powers and the
circumstances that trigger them rather than to do away with them
altogether. While the MSEHPA could benefit from further narrowing
on the procedural latitude given the governor invoking a public health
emergency, the broad definition of triggering events listed under the
definition of "public health emergency" in the Model Act is not as
problematic as some critics of the law argue. Precisely because these
powers may need to be invoked in circumstances that have not yet
been contemplated, the definition meant to encompass them must be
broad. However, because the list of events triggering an emergency is
broad, it is crucial that greater safeguards be placed on the executive in
the form of relatively prompt review of the governor's declaration of a
state of emergency by the legislature.

V. SPECIAL POWERS DURING A STATE OF PUBLIC HEALTH
EMERGENCY- PROTECTION OF PERSONS

This Part discusses compulsory medical examination, testing,
vaccination and treatment, as well isolation and quarantine. These
issues raise complex and troubling constitutional questions that force
us to seriously consider where the outer limits of civil liberties

96.
97.

Id. (quoting Oliver Cromwell).
Cihak & Glueck, supra note 9.
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protections lie and to determine the proper balance between an
individual's liberty interests and the community's public health
interests.
A. Compulsory medical examinations, testing, vaccination,and
treatment

Sections 602 and 603 of the MSEHPA lay out the contours of the
state's authority to administer compulsory medical examinations, tests,
vaccinations and/or treatments during a state of public health
emergency. Section 602 authorizes the public health authority to
"perform physical examinations and/or tests as necessary for the
diagnosis or treatment of individuals."98 Section 603 gives the public
health authority the ability to "exercise ...emergency powers over
persons . . . [t]o vaccinate persons as protection against infectious
disease and to prevent the spread of contagious disease or possibly
contagious disease." 99 Based on this provision, the public health
authority may exercise its authority to adopt a regime of forced
vaccination. Section 603 also serves as the basis for the public health
authority to "exercise ...emergency powers over persons ... to treat
persons exposed to or infected with disease," including forced
treatment where necessary.'O The one limitation on the public health
authority's ability to compel examinations, testing, vaccination and/or
treatment is that such measures cannot be of a nature that they would
be "reasonably likely to lead to serious harm to the affected
individual."10' Thus, the Model Act allows for compulsory physical
examination, testing, vaccination and medical treatment so long as the
state's action is not likely to lead to serious harm under a
reasonableness standard.
Questions of compulsory examination, testing, vaccination and
treatment once again raise concerns regarding the proper balance
between individual liberties and collective public health interests. 2
There is no question that compulsory examination, vaccination and
treatment are serious violations of bodily integrity that deprive

98.
99.
100.

MSEHPA, supra note 11, § 602.
Id. § 603.
Id. § 603(b).

101.
102.

Id. §§ 602(b), 603(a)(2), 603(b)(2).
See discussion in text accompanying supra notes 48-55.
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subjected individuals of some degree of liberty.' °3 The individual has a
constitutional right to refuse treatment based on the concept of bodily
integrity.1M This right to refuse treatment is also rooted in the common
law.' °5 While the Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed 0a 6 right of
bodily integrity, it has also held that this right is not absolute.
As Justice Tom C. Clark stated in Breithauptv. Abram: "[a]s against
the right of an individual that his person be held inviolable ...must be
set the interests of society."' 0 7 Likewise, Gostin points out that
compulsory measures may be necessary in order to satisfy one or more
of the state's interests in preserving public health in the case of a public
health emergency. Gostin then identifies three distinct state interests9
First, the state has an interest in preserving the lives of infected

persons.'0 Second, the state has an interest in preventing harm to
others. ""Third, the state has an interest in preserving the effectiveness
of drug-based therapies for infectious diseases." For the purposes of
our discussion, these three state interests provide a useful guide to the
societal interests that must be weighed against those of the individual.
Balancing individual liberty interests against the state's communal
interests, the Supreme Court has often tolerated restrictions of
individual liberty in order to further state interests."2 While forcing

103. See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229 (1990) (stating that "The
forcible injection of medication into a nonconsenting person's body represents a
substantial interference with that person's liberty.").
104. GOSTIN, supra note 27, at 217-19 (discussing the constitutional right to
refuse treatment) (citing Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992) (holding that in
compelling physical examination and treatment, the state must demonstrate an
"overriding justification and determination of medical appropriateness"); Rivers v.
Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337, 343 (N.Y. 1986) (holding that, under the New York State
Constitution, individuals have the right to "control the course of their medical
treatment")).
105. See, e.g., In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 70 (N.Y. 1981) (stating that, at
common law, every competent adult has a "right to determine what should be
done with his own body") (cited in GOSTIN, supra note 27, at 217-218).
106. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 299 (1982) (cited in GOSTIN, supra note 27, at
219).
107. Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 439 (1957).
108. GOSTIN, supra note 27, at 219-220.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 220.
111. Id. at 221.
112. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); National
Treasury Employees Union v. Ron Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); Washington v.
Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990)) (all cases cited in GOSTIN, supra note 27, at 219).
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treatment upon an unwilling competent adult in order to preserve that
person's own life has been held a violation of the person's right to
refuse treatment," 3 courts are willing to allow compulsory treatment
where the person poses a danger to others.'14 However, compulsory
treatment may be held unconstitutional where the person did not pose
a danger to others or the treatment was not medically appropriate."' In
the case of forced vaccination, the Supreme Court has found that
vaccination is a constitutional exercise of the state's police powers due
to its crucial importance for execution of the state's obligation to
protect communal public health." 6 Nevertheless, the state must
implement forced vaccination schemes in a reasonable manner, so that
the state cannot force an individual to be vaccinated if it is clear that
the individual to be vaccinated would have an adverse reaction --a
requirement which clearly informed the drafting of sections 602(b),
603(a)(2) and 603(b)(2) of the Model Act.1 8 Thus, the state can only
compel medical examination or treatment where the individual poses a
significant risk of transmission, and the treatment has clear medical
benefits.1

9

In order to enforce the examination and testing provisions in section
602, the public health authority is authorized to isolate or quarantine
''any person whose refusal of medical examination or testing results in
uncertainty regarding whether he or she has been exposed to or is
infected with a contagious or possibly contagious disease or otherwise

113.

See, e.g., Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281 (stating that "It cannot be disputed that

the Due Process Clause protects an interest in life as well as an interest in refusing
life-sustaining medical treatment.").
114. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1904) (stating that the
state may require its citizens to submit to medical procedures in order to eliminate
a health threat to the community); Kulak v. City of New York, 88 F.3d 63, 74 (2d
Cir. 1996) (stating that a patient has the right to determine what shall be done with
his or her own body and that the patient's right to control the course of their own
medical treatment may be set aside only in narrow circumstances, including those
where the patient presents a danger to himself or other members of society);
GOSTIN, supra note 27, at 220.
115. See, e.g., Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992) (stating that "forcing
antipsychotic drugs on a convicted prisoner is impermissible absent a finding of
overriding justification and a determination of medical appropriateness") (cited in
GOSTIN, supra note 27, at 220).

116.

Jacobson, 197 U.S. 11.

117.
118.
119.

Id. at 37-39.
See supra text accompanying note 101.
GOSTIN, supra note 27, at 220.
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poses a danger to public health."12 Likewise, the Model Act allows for
enforcement of its vaccination and treatment provisions by authorizing
use of quarantine or isolation when an individual is "unable or
unwilling for reasons of health, religion, or conscience" to undergo
vaccination or treatment pursuant to section 603.121 As the next section
will discuss, isolation and quarantine .•are 122legitimate tools in the
prevention of spreading contagious disease. However, sections 602
and 603 of the Model Act envision the use of quarantine and isolation
as a mechanism for enforcement of the statute's provisions for forced
examination, testing, vaccination and treatment even where a person's
refusal to undergo such measures results in mere "uncertainty
regarding whether he or she has been exposed to" a possibly
contagious disease. This seems to suggest that the civil commitment
method of quarantine and isolation is being used as a penal mechanism
in lieu of criminal prosecution, thereby bypassing the extensive
criminal procedural protections that imprisonment would necessitate.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly discussed the clear distinction
between civil commitment proceedings and criminal prosecutions, and
concluded that civil commitment, like criminal imprisonment requires
due process protection. 23 The key difference is that civil commitment
requires a lower standard of proof than
•
124the "beyond a reasonable
doubt standard" of criminal prosecutions.
In the Addington v. Texas
case, involving civil commitment for mental illness, the Court declared
that it had repeatedly "recognized that civil commitment for any
purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires
due process protection.' ' 125 The Court reasoned "that the individual's
interest in the outcome of a civil commitment proceeding is of such
weight and gravity that due process requires the state to justify

120.
121.
122.
123.

MSEHPA, supra note 11, § 602(c).
Id. §§ 603(a)(3),603(b)(3).
See discussion infra Part V-B.
See, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S.

418 (1979) (cited in GOSTIN, supra note 27, at 213 n.94); Jackson v. Indiana, 406

U.S. 715 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1
(1967); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967). But see Morales v. Turman, 562
F.2d 993, 998 (5th Cir. 1977) ("A state should not be required to provide the
procedural safeguards of a criminal trial when imposing a quarantine to protect the
public against a highly communicable disease.") (cited in GOSTIN, supra note 27, at
215 n.110).
124. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J. , Concurring) (cited in
Addington, 441 U.S. at 424 (1979)).
125. Addington, 441 U.S. at 428.
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confinement by proof more substantial than a mere preponderance of
the evidence" but that the "beyond a reasonable doubt standard"
historically reserved for criminal law was inappropriate for civil
confinement cases that involved "medical 'impressions' drawn from
subjective analysis and filtered through the experience of the
diagnostician. 1 2 6 Thus, the Addington Court concluded that due
process in a civil commitment case requires a middle level standard of
proof (e.g. "clear, unequivocal and convincing").2 7
The Addington Court also explained that one of the "significant
reasons why different standards of proof are called for in civil
commitment proceedings as opposed to criminal prosecutions" is that
"[i]n a civil commitment state power is not exercised in a punitive
sense."' 128 Thus, one of the defining features of civil confinement is that
it is not used as a punitive measure. Where confinement is used as a
form of punishment, the required standard of proof should be "beyond
a reasonable doubt."
In a situation involving a public health emergency, it is certainly
possible that a person might fail to comply with a compulsory public
health scheme and that this failure to comply may be reason for the
state to isolate or quarantine such person under the criteria provided
in sections 104(h) (isolation) and 104(o) (quarantine).129 However,
quarantine and isolation should not be used as a punitive measure.
Section 604(a) contains a problematic presumption that "individuals or
groups who have not been vaccinated, treated, tested, or examined
pursuant to Sections 602 and 603" would be subject to isolation or
quarantine under sections 104(h) or 104(o).130 The resulting quarantine
or isolation would be effectively the same as for a person deemed to
fall under sections 104(h) and 104(o). However, the process would
involve a blurring of civil confinement and punitive criminal
prosecution. Quarantine and isolation under sections 104(h) and
104(o) is preferable because the former delinks the quarantine and

126. Id. at 430.
127. Id. at 431-32.
128. Id. at 428
129. For exact text of sections 104(h) and 104(o), see discussion accompanying
infra notes 140-142.
130. MSEHPA, supra note 11, § 604(a) ("During the public health emergency,
the public health authority may isolate (consistent with the definition of 'isolation'
in Section 103(h) [sic]) or quarantine (consistent with the definition of quarantine
in section 103(o) [sic]) an individual or group of individuals. This includes
individuals or groups who have not been vaccinated, treated, tested, or examined
pursuant to Sections 602 and 603.").
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isolation analysis from the compulsory treatment analysis. Using
sections 104(h) and 104(o) as a basis for quarantine and isolation,
rather than presuming that those failing to comply with compulsory
public health measures would fall under 104(h) or 104(o), means that
the law would force the public health authority to engage in a separate
determination of whether quarantine or isolation is appropriate. This,
in turn, reduces the likelihood that a public health official will be able
to invoke quarantine and isolation as a punishment for failure to
comply with a compulsory scheme. This proposed modification to the
model law would help ensure that quarantine and isolation measures
will not involve exercise of state power in a punitive sense and that
these civil confinement measures will not be used as a way to bypass
the higher standard of proof required for enforcement of punitive
criminal laws.
The Model Act's provisions authorizing the state to forcibly subject
individuals to examination, testing, vaccination and treatment are
necessary in order to provide the state with the range of tools it may
need in responding to a public health emergency. While the balance
between individual interests, and communal interests is a tricky one, it
is clearly possible for the state to exercise its compulsory powers in a
constitutional manner. However, the presumption that individuals or
groups refusing vaccination, treatment, testing or examination should
be subject to quarantine and isolation leads to the problematic
potential abuse of quarantine and isolation as a mechanism for
enforcing compulsory public health measures. Legislators looking to
the Model Act for guidance should consider alternative methods to
enforcing the statute's emergency powers, including the possibility of
arresting and trying these individuals in accordance with standard
criminal procedures.
B. Isolation and quarantine
Sections 604 and 605 of the MSEHPA lay out provisions for
implementation of isolation and quarantine in the case of a public
health emergency."' Quarantine and isolation are words often used
interchangeably, but they are in fact distinct terms with clear technical
meanings. 3 2 "Quarantine" is generally defined as "detention, under
enforced isolation, of persons suspected of carrying a contagious
disease."' 33 "Isolation" is the separation of people known to be infected

131.
132.
133.

MSEHPA, supra note 11, §§ 604-605.
GOSTIN, supra note 27, at 209.
Id.
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from the general population in such a manner so as "prevent or limit
the transmission of the infectious agent.', 3 4 So quarantine applies to
persons suspected of carrying a disease while isolation applies to
persons known to be infected. In analyzing the scope and procedure of
measures in the Model Act that require restriction of personal liberty,
it is important to keep in mind this distinction between quarantine and
isolation.
Any kind of restriction of personal liberty such as quarantine or
isolation raises serious civil liberties questions. 35 The problem is that
most of the cases reviewing quarantine measures predate the
developments in fourteenth amendment jurisprudence of the later half
of the twentieth century, and it is unclear how modern constitutional
jurisprudence would impact judicial review of quarantine regulations.
Thus far, quarantine measures have been assumed to be a legitimate
exercise of the police power. In Hennington v. Georgia,116 for example,
the Supreme Court held that:
[Q]uarantine laws of every description, if they have real relation
to the objects named in them, are to be referred to the power
which the states have to make provision for the health and safety
of their people. But neither inspection, quarantine nor health
laws enacted by a State have been adjudged void, by force alone
of the Constitution and in the absence of Congressional
legislation, simply because they remotely, or even directly,
affected or temporarily suspended commerce among the State
and with foreign nations. Of course, if the inspection, quarantine
or health laws of a State, passed under its reserved power to
provide for the health, comfort, and safety of its people, come
into conflict with an act of Congress, passed under its power to

134. Id. at 210.
135.

For excellent surveys of the civil liberties issues relating to quarantine, see

GOSTIN, supra note 27, at 203-216; Lawrence Gostin, Tuberculosis and the Power
of the State: Toward the Development of Rational Standards for the Review of
Compulsory Public Health Powers, 2 U. CHi. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 219 (1995); and
Ronald Bayer & Amy Fairchild-Carrino, AIDS and the Limits of Control: Public
Health Orders, Quarantine, and Recalcitrant Behavior, 83 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
1471 (1993). Cf.Joseph Barber et al., Large-Scale QuarantineFollowing Biological
Terrorism in the United States: Scientific Examination, Logistics and Legal Limits,
and Possible Consequences, 286 JAMA 2711 (2001) (arguing that quarantine of
entire populations in the event of a bioterrorism attack may not be the most
effective method for containing the spread of infectious disease and that there may
be better methods for limiting the spread of disease that are less likely to infringe
upon civil liberties).
136. 163 U.S. 299 (1896) (cited in GOSTIN, supra note 27, at 206 n.19).
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regulate inter-state and foreign commerce, such local
regulations, to the extent of the conflict, must give way in order
that the supreme law of the land-an act of Congress passed in
pursuance
of the Constitution-may have unobstructed
j. 137
operation.

Thus, we see that quarantine laws have historically been allowed as
legitimate exercises of a State's police powers, and that the power to
quarantine falls to the states unless such power is superceded by
Congressional action taken in the interests of inter-state commerce.
Indeed, there are federal quarantine laws in place, which give the
federal government the power to use quarantine as a method of
preventing the spread of disease. 118 While a federal quarantine is the
likely mechanism to be used should quarantine be necessary to
respond to a public health emergency that is national in scope, it is
important that each state have its own quarantine laws to respond to
local public health emergencies or to implement a federal response at
the local level.139

The MSEHPA is a great step forward in laying the groundwork for
debate on reconsideration and improvement of state quarantine laws.
However, the MSEHPA quarantine and isolation provisions do have
some problematic elements. As a general rule, the Model Act
empowers the state public health authority to "isolate . .

.

or

137. Hennington, 163 U.S. at 309; see also Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a
Vapeur v. La. State Bd. of Health, 186 U.S. 380 (1902) (reasoning that "whenever
Congress shall undertake to provide ... a general system of quarantine, or shall
confide the execution of the details of such a system to a National Board of
Health, or to local boards, as may be found expedient, all state laws on the subject
will be abrogated, at least so far as the two are inconsistent. But, until this is done,
the laws of the State on the subject are valid.") (cited in GOSTIN, supra note 27, at
206 n.20).
138. 42 U.S.C. §§ 243, 264, 266-272 (2002). The federal quarantine laws were
recently invoked by President Bush when he added SARS (Severe Acute
Respiratory Syndrome) to the list of quarantinable diseases as a "pragmatic step of
readying all options" in tackling SARS. E.O. 13295, April 4, 2003, 68 Fed. Reg.
17,255; Press Release, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Statement
by HHS Secretary Tommy G. Thompson Regarding Executive Order on
Quarantinable Diseases (Apr. 4, 2003), availableat http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/
2003pres/20030404a.html.
139. See State Emergency Health Powers and the Bioterrorism Threat, supra
note7, at 5, 8-13.
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quarantine... an individual or group of individuals.' 140 For purposes of
this provision, the Model Act defines "quarantine" as:
the physical separation and confinement of an individual or groups
of individuals, who are or may have been exposed to a contagious or
possibly contagious disease and who do not show signs or symptoms of
a contagious disease, from non-quarantined individuals, to prevent 4 or
1
limit the transmission of the disease to non-quarantined individuals.
Clearly distinguishing quarantine from isolation, the MSEHPA
defines "isolation" as "the physical separation and confinement of an
individual or groups of individuals who are infected or reasonably
believed to be infected with a contagious or possibly contagious
disease from non-isolated individuals, to prevent 42 or limit the
transmission of the disease to non-isolated individuals."'
The definitions of both "quarantine" and "isolation" in the Model
Act are not sufficiently narrow. First of all, the inclusion of individuals
broad.14 1
who "may have been exposed" to a contagious disease is too
Use of measures as restrictive as a quarantine should only be limited to
people who have in fact been exposed to the disease. Second, the
applicability of this provision to "possible contagious disease" is also
far too open-ended. Once again, when implementing measures as
coercive as quarantine, it is important that the criteria for determining
to whom it applies must be based on scientific facts. This method
should only be used when a disease is known to be contagious, through
extensive scientific study. Furthermore, the quarantine and isolation
power extends so far as to allow the public health authority to isolate
and quarantine "individuals or groups who have not been vaccinated,
treated, tested, or examined."'" This provision essentially allows the
public health authority to quarantine anyone it suspects of being
infected or having come in contact with someone who is infected,
without requiring that there be any scientific basis for this
determination such as a medical test. Legislators looking to this Model
Act for guidance would be well advised to adopt a much more

140.

MSEHPA, supra note 11, § 604(a).

141.

Id. § 104(o).

142.

Id. § 104(h).

143.

Id. § 104(o).

144. Id. § 604(a). The "least restrictive alternative" language seems to be
borrowed from case law holding that the state can resort to quarantine via
confinement only when it could not achieve its objectives through less drastic
means. City of New York v. Doe, 614 N.Y.S.2d 8 (App. Div. 1994) (cited in
GOSTIN, supra note 27, at 215 n.104). See also text accompanying infra note 165.
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restrictive approach to the application of quarantine and isolation
measures.
The Model Act does lay down conditions and principles to which the
public health authority is expected to adhere when isolating or
quarantining individuals. First, the public health authority must use the
"least restrictive means necessary" to prevent the spread of the
disease. 145 Furthermore, isolated individuals must be physically
separated from quarantined individuals, 146 lest those who are actually
infected spread the disease to those in quarantine who are not
infected.147 The state must further monitor the status of infection of
isolated and quarantined individuals to determine that the kind of
confinement to which they are subjected is still necessary, and it must
transfer infected individuals to isolation or release those individuals
who pose "no substantial risk of transmitting" the disease. The
statute also establishes a minimum standard of care for persons in
isolation or quarantine. 149 While these measures are not adequate as
checks on the overbroadness of the definitions of quarantine and
isolation discussed above, they are important steps in ensuring that any
quarantine and isolation scheme will be implemented with adequate
regard to the safety and well being of the affected individuals.
In addition to the aforementioned substantive protections, the
Model Act lays out a detailed procedural scheme in an attempt to
protect the due process rights of isolated and quarantined
individuals.5 Recognizing that the kinds of procedure that can be
implemented may depend on the urgency of the emergency, the model
formulates two kinds of procedures: one for "temporary isolation and
15 and one
quarantine without notice""
for "isolation or quarantine with
''
2
notice. 11 Temporary quarantine and isolation may be implemented
via a written directive in circumstances where "a delay in imposing the
isolation or quarantine would significantly jeopardize the public health
authority's ability to prevent or limit the transmission of a contagious

Id. § 604(b)(1).
146. Id. § 604(b)(2).
147. See Jew Ho v. Williamson, 103 F. 10 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1900) (example of a
quarantine that was implemented without separating the infected individuals from
the non-infected ones).
148. MSEHPA, supranote 11, § 604(b)(5).
149. Id. § 604(b)(6).
150. Id. § 605.
151. Id. § 605(a)(1)(emphasis added).
152. Id.§ 605(b)(1) (emphasis added).
145.
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or possible contagious disease to others."'53 The model establishes
specific content requirements for the directive and requires that the
public health authority file a petition for a court order authorizing the
isolation or quarantine measures taken within ten days after issuance
of the written directive. 114 Ten days is a considerable amount of time to
spend in isolation without a proper court order, so legislators may want
to consider shortening this period of time. Otherwise, these procedural
safeguards seem quite fair in circumstances in which the need for an
urgent response does not allow for judicial review prior to subjecting
an individual to quarantine or isolation.
A preferable alternative to that laid out above is the "isolation or
quarantine with notice" provision, which involves the public health
authority filing a written petition with the local trial court for an order
authorizing the isolation or quarantine of an individual or group."'
One of the requirements of this petition is that it include a "statement
of compliance with the conditions and principles for isolation and
quarantine of Section 604(b)" discussed above. 56 This provision
further requires that the petition include a statement explaining the
basis for isolation or quarantine and that it be accompanied by a sworn
affidavit of the public health authority attesting to the facts asserted in
the petition.157 Section 605(b) further provides that a court hearing
must be held within five days of the petition being filed. 58 Upon
reviewing the petition, the court will determine whether "by a
preponderance of the evidence, isolation or quarantine is shown to be
reasonably necessary to prevent or limit the transmission of a
contagious or possibly contagious disease to others."'5 9 Should the
court grant the order, it may only authorize isolation or quarantine for
up to thirty days, though the public health authority may move to

153. Id. § 605(a).
154. Id.
155. Id. § 605(b).
156. Id. § 605(b)(2); see supra text accompanying notes 145-149.
157. MSEHPA, supra note 11, § 605(b)(2).
158. Id. § 605(b)(4). The provision does allow the public health authority to
apply to continue the hearing date for up to ten days "in extraordinary
circumstances and for good cause shown." Id. In deciding whether to allow the
continuance, the reviewing court is expected to "giv[e] due regard to the rights of

the affected individuals, the protection of the public's health, the severity of the
emergency and the availability of necessary witnesses and evidence." Id.
159.

Id.§ 605(b)(5).
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continue isolation or quarantine for additional periods of up to thirty
days each.' 60
In addition to the above protections, the Model Act provides that
those subject to isolation or quarantine under this law may apply to the
trial court for habeas-like review, requiring that the public health
authority show cause why the person(s) in question should not be
released. 16' This provision establishes a clear set of deadlines, limiting
to three days the period from submission of the application to show
cause to the actual court hearing. 162 Quarantined or isolated individuals
are also given the right to request a court hearing for remedies
regarding breaches of the statute's conditions for quarantine or
isolation.1 63 Finally, the Model Act requires that the court appoint
counsel to represent any individual(s) in hearings related to isolation
or quarantine if they do not retain their own counsel.'9 These
procedures do seem to be an effective way to ensure that the relevant
authorities actually comply with the conditions and principles laid out
in the law and, if implemented, would significantly reduce the risk that
the due process rights of those quarantined or isolated will be violated.
It is essential that any quarantine or isolation mechanism established
by the state include provisions for this kind of judicial review.
It is also important to bear in mind that in addition to any
statutory limitations on the quarantine and isolation powers, any
quarantine or isolation program implemented by the state health
authority must conform to constitutional standards requiring the state
to demonstrate that there is a compelling public health interest, that
the intervention is "well-targeted" and that there is no "less restrictive
alternative" for preventing spread of the disease.'
The Constitution
also requires that the state provide individuals subject to detention

160. Id. §§ 605(b)(5)-(6).
161. Id. § 605(c).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. § 605(e).
165. GOSTIN, supra note 27, at 214. See generally id. at 213-215 (describing in
detail the state's obligation to demonstrate that there is a compelling state interest,
that the intervention is well-targeted, and that the state is adopting the least
restrictive alternative) (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473
U.S. 432, 440 (1985); Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1969);
Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1096 (E.D. Wis. 1972); City of New York v.
Doe, 614 N.Y.S.2d 8 (App. Div. 1994)).
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with procedural due process.'6 Given the procedural protections of
section 605, it is likely that the Model Act's quarantine measures will
satisfy procedural due process requirements should they be challenged
in any court. However, the overbroad definitions of quarantine and
isolation in section 104 of the Model Act167 may not satisfy the
requirement that such measures be "well targeted" and the "less
restrictive alternative" available, and thus may not pass constitutional
muster.
Consequently, it is important that these definitions be
narrowed in the manner discussed earlier in this section.'6
VI. CONCLUSION
The MSEHPA is an important piece of model legislation that has
been and will continue to be used by many state legislators as they
update their public health laws in response to public demands for
improved preparedness on the part of the public health infrastructure.
September 11 and the anthrax scare have brought a new sense of
urgency to the project of public health law revision and galvanized
state legislatures to begin updating often outdated legislation. The aim
of these projects is to provide government authorities with necessary
tools for quick and effective response to future public health threats
resulting from bioterrorist attack or naturally occurring infectious or
contagious disease. In order to evaluate the MSEHPA as a model for
legislative reform, this Article analyzes three elements of the Model
Act-measures to detect and track public health emergencies, the
trigger for declaration of a public health emergency and the
compulsory powers of the state over the person in a time of public
health emergency-and concludes that while the Act lays down a
generally sound framework for government response in a public health
emergency, it does not strike the appropriate balance between granting
authority to the state and protecting individual liberty.
First, the provisions for mandatory reporting of diseases and other
health conditions overstep the bounds of privacy. Further, the Model
Act should set stricter limits on the types of data that can be reported
and the range of people to whom they may be reported. The Model
Act also should provide a mechanism for patient consent for release of
information and for judicial review in cases where patients do not give

166. Id. at 215 (citing O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 580 (1975) (Berger,
C.J., concurring); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-27 (1979); Vitek v. Jones,
445 U.S. 480, 491-92 (1980); Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 971 (2d Cir.
1983)).
167. See supra text accompanying notes 140-149.
168. Id.
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consent. Second, the section of the Model Act setting the conditions
for declaration of a public health emergency, while justifiably broad in
order to encompass the broad range of unforeseen possibilities, must
incorporate greater safeguards on the executive in the form of
relatively prompt review of the governor's declaration of a state of
emergency by the legislature. Third, the compulsory powers granted to
the state under the Model Act-examination, testing, vaccination and
treatment-are justifiable as long as they are implemented in a manner
consistent with the Constitution. However, the Model Act's use of
quarantine or isolation as a mechanism for enforcement of the state's
compulsory powers must be reconsidered. Finally, the definition of
quarantine and isolation in the MSEHPA must be more narrowly
tailored to satisfy the constitutional requirements that such measures
be well targeted and adopt the least restrictive alternative available.
While these definitions must be refined, it is worth noting that the
Model Act's procedural mechanisms for implementation and review of
quarantine and isolation present a procedural framework for the most
extreme form of compulsory government power over the person that
strikes the right balance between individual liberties and community
interests.
The MSEHPA does not reflect the most desirable response to public
health emergencies. There is no question that effective government
leadership and voluntary cooperation between citizens and local
authorities are the cornerstones of effective public health response.
However, it is important that the legal authority be in place for the
government to utilize compulsory measures in the face of adverse
citizen response. As the anthrax scare suggests, it is possible that even
when the community comes together in response to tragic events that
threaten the well being of a nation, individual citizens may take
advantage of the situation to exacerbate rather than help it. The
general model of cooperation seen in the fall of 2001 presents the ideal
framework for effective response to a public health emergency; the
MSEHPA presents the necessary tools for dealing with situations in
which the ideal response does not take effect. The U.S. Constitution
and laws are robust and resilient, and it is therefore crucial that
Americans seek to build a degree of flexibility into them by allowing
for the government to evoke emergency powers in the face of
emergency. If citizens design appropriate responses to public health
emergencies within this framework of laws rather than resigning
themselves to extralegal responses in the face of necessity, Americans
will ultimately be doing a great service to both their interests as
individuals and their interests as members of a community.

